INTERVIEW, Page 10Vindication Of a Hard-LinerLong the prophet of Communism's doom, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKIforesees the end of the U.S.S.R. in its present form
By STROBE TALBOTT and ROBERT T. ZINTL
Q. You've always been a strong critic of the Soviets, yet just
in the past month you have been given a standing ovation at the
Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, you've been respectfully interviewed
in Pravda and even given prime-time coverage on Soviet television.
What has it been like for you personally?
A. Well, I wouldn't be human if I didn't confess to a certain
amount of ego gratification. When I stood in front of the foreign
policy establishment in the Soviet Union and was given a generally
empathetic reception, I had a sense of, if you will, historical
vindication. But I also had a sense of something much more
important. There was a breakthrough taking place in the thinking
of people who for 70 years were artificially divorced from the
intellectual and philosophical currents of the Western world. They
are now in the process of restoring some of those connections, of
rejoining that process. They are much more willing to be
self-critical and to listen to criticism. They appreciate the
degree to which the Soviet Union has fallen out of step with global
development, and that has driven them in the direction of seeking
far-reaching changes.
The last two years of this decade could be the Spring of
Nations in Central Europe. I am deliberately drawing the analogy
to 1848, which was called the Spring of Nations because Central
European nations rose against authoritarianism.
Q. Given the violent aftermath of 1848, that's not a very happy
precedent.
A. No, it isn't. But if things in Central Europe or the Soviet
Union go wrong, which they could, I don't think we'll see a return
to an assertive, confident, Stalinist renewal. Instead, we'll
probably see a turn toward some highly nationalistic form of
dictatorship, perhaps what I call a "Holy Alliance" between the
Soviet Army and the Russian Orthodox Church, galvanized by a sense
of desperate Great Russian nationalism. That would then produce
even more intense reactions from non-Russians. It could be a very
ugly picture.
Q. What's the worst case you can imagine?
A. I can imagine a Soviet intervention in East Germany, where
the Soviets have a lot of troops on the ground and therefore on the
spot. If the East German Communist regime were to collapse through
violence and if the Soviets were to remain passive, then the whole
thing would collapse, in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The
Soviets know that if they let go of East Germany, Poland is lost.
That's why it is so urgent for us, the West, collectively, to
give this turbulence a chance to work itself out constructively in
the direction of some form of pluralist democracy. So far, we have
not responded in a manner that does justice to the magnitude of the
opportunity, or, alas, to the magnitude of the threat inherent in
these truly earthquake-like political phenomena.
Q. What should we be doing?
A. First, we need to discuss with all the parties concerned the
implications of change in Central Europe, and also of change in
Germany, because the two are related. We cannot end the division
of Europe without also, in some fashion, ending the division of
Germany. We are past the day when the future of Europe could be
shaped either by us or by the Soviets alone, or even by us with the
West Europeans. We now need to talk in equal depth with the
Russians, with our allies, the West Europeans, and with our
friends, the Central Europeans.
Q. Are you using the term "Central Europeans" interchangeably
with what we would call "East Europeans"?
A. I'm using it now instead of "East Europeans." East Europe
was the geopolitical designation for a reality that is now
disappearing.
The military confrontation in the heart of Europe is waning,
so there should be significant cuts in our defense budget. Security
should be based on some new relationship between the two alliances,
rather than a dissolution of the two alliances. Perhaps there could
be a long-term arrangement for a transitional NATO and Warsaw Pact
presence in the respective parts of a reconfederated Germany, so
that there is no insecurity bred.
Suppose we save $20 billion to $30 billion in defense spending
on Europe in the next few years. Let's dedicate a third or a fourth
of that to a Central European Recovery Fund. If we make a
substantial contribution, I think the Europeans will more than
match it, and we can bring the Japanese into it.
Q. When Gorbachev persuades the elite to go along with his
policies, where is the upside? What have they gained?
A. Only a respite from the strains of the competition as well
as an opportunity to address their internal problems and modernize
their system. That is what Gorbachev and the people around him are
hoping to accomplish.
At the same time, I left the Soviet Union with a sense of deep
foreboding. We're getting to a point where Gorbachev and his
colleagues will have to make some fundamental choices, all of them
very difficult and all of them pregnant with dangers. He will
either have to accelerate perestroika, really pushing it forward
in the direction of pluralism and the free market, or he will have
to engage in severe repression of the non-Russians.
Q. In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs you say that the
U.S.S.R. is becoming a "volcano" and a "battleground" of warring
nationalities. Will there even be a U.S.S.R. in the year 2001?
A. No. There will have to be something very different. The pace
of change, the scale of change, and the drama of the change are all
such that we have to stop thinking in conventional terms. Perhaps
there will be a Soviet confederation of some sort, much looser than
what there is now, with some new form of associated statehood for
the Baltic republics. Georgia and some of the other more nationally
defined republics could enjoy a much more independent status within
the Soviet confederation. If they don't have that, then they will
have to have some form of Great Russian nationalist dictatorship.
I think Gorbachev is trying to persuade the non-Russian nations
that they have to accept some form of yet undefined pluralism as
the only alternative.
Q. Does Gorbachev know what he is doing? Does he have a clear
plan?
A. I think his speeches reflect a thoughtful man, who really
realizes that the ideological oversimplifications of the past
several decades are irrelevant. The hours I spent with some of his
people increased my feeling that they are intelligently,
thoughtfully, and in some ways boldly responding to the short-term
problems that they are confronting and which they have the
intellectual acumen to identify and not to evade. But I am less
certain now that they have any comprehensive, long-range vision.
Q. How about the Bush Administration? Does it have a
comprehensive, long-range vision?
A. Well, in the late 1940s President Truman had around him a
cluster of creative people who asked themselves how the West should
respond to the collapse of Germany. Now is the time to ask
ourselves, creatively and historically, how do we respond to the
apparent collapse of the Soviet Union? We can either deliberately
shape a new world or simply let the old disintegrate -- with some
